Dr. Prasert Suksaskawin
Dean of the Faculty of Public Administration, Siam Technology College
The conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States is arguably one of the most complex and protracted case studies in post-Cold War international politics. Their relationship is not linear but rather cyclical, fluctuating between tension, de-escalation, and low-level military confrontation, culminating in war with the US attack on Iran on February 28, 2569. Mainstream analysts often explain this phenomenon through a realist lens on international relations, emphasizing national interests and the balance of power in the Middle East, portraying it as an unavoidable conflict.
However, bilateral analyses often neglect internal structural factors and the role of “external actors” that significantly influence the foreign policy-making process. Therefore, this article aims to apply the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument (TKI), originally a tool for analyzing conflict management behavior at the individual and organizational levels, to the international level to explain the competitive behavior between the United States and Iran. It also critiques the limitations of this theoretical framework in explaining the influence of interest groups and allied states such as Israel, and lobbying groups like the Deep State (AIPAC).
Analyzing the Iran-US conflict through the lens of "competition".
An analysis of the strategic behavior of the United States and Iran reveals that both states operate primarily in a competitive mode, characterized by the following: a zero-sum game, where both sides view their own security as a direct adversary of the other. Victory or expansion of influence for one side inevitably means loss for the other. The US has pursued maximum economic pressure, military deterrence, and global isolation of Iran. Iran has retaliated by developing its nuclear capabilities, employing asymmetric warfare strategies, and building regional alliances (axis of resistance). Therefore, the foreign policy behavior of both countries reflects a high level of conflict and extremism on both sides. This makes a transition to a mode of "cooperation" or even "compromise," such as the past JCPOA 5+1 agreement, difficult, and even if such a transition were to occur, the relationship might not be sustainable.
Critiquing the limitations of the theory. migrant workers In managing conflict.
Although the TKI theoretical framework can explain...External behavioral patternsWhile the state's stance is clearly expressed, in the academic field of international relations, this framework has two significant structural limitations when analyzing conflicts at this level:
1. The Assumption of Unified Actors: TKI theory is based on the assumption that the parties involved are single actors with their own unified will. However, in reality, a state's foreign policy is the result of a two-level game involving negotiations between domestic and international factors. The competitive behavior of the United States is not based on state consensus but is also shaped by internal interest groups.
2. Neglecting the Role of Third Actors: The most serious limitation of TKI theory is its view of conflicts in a bilateral manner, neglecting external variables that play a determinant role in this case. The US's aggressive competitive policy towards Iran, in many cases, does not directly serve its strategic national interests, but rather stems from structural pressures from two main actors: firstly, Israel, which views Iran as a threat to its state's existence and therefore pursues an aggressive strategy to maintain the US's status quo and use military action against Iran; and secondly, US lobbying groups, highly influential in legislative processes and political funding in Washington, act as a linking mechanism to pressure US policymakers to choose a competitive mode rather than a mode of compromise.
Therefore, the competitive behavior of the United States is not merely a matter of free choice within the framework of TKI theory, but rather a behavior that is guided and restricted by significant behind-the-scenes actors.
Analyzing the Iran-US conflict through the Thomas-Kilmann (TKI) framework provides a systematic picture of behavioral dynamics based on competition and confrontation. However, this framework suffers from a significant weakness in neglecting structural factors and third actors. A deep understanding of this conflict cannot be achieved by considering bilateral behavior solely on the axis of cooperation and expression. It requires integration with Interest Group Theory and Domestic Structure Theory to reveal that the mode of competition on the international stage may actually be a result of power games and domestic lobbying. Therefore, transcending this cycle of conflict is not simply about adjusting the stances of the US or Iran, but rather about addressing the dynamics of the underlying actors with vested interests in the persistence of this conflict—a crucial aspect of international conflict in the transitional era of the new world order.
